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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4156
___________________
CHUKWUMA E. AZUBUKO,
Appellant
v.
JUDGE PATTI S. SARIS IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-04037)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 20, 2006
Before: ROTH, RENDELL AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed February 16, 2006 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
In August 2005, Chukwuma Azubuko filed a pro se complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. In his complaint, Azubuko alleged that
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Judge Patti S. Saris violated his First, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights by
enforcing a 1995 injunction which prohibited him from filing any further documents in
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts without prior judicial
approval. Azubuko sought monetary damages as well as injunctive relief. By order
entered August 18, 2005, the District Court granted Azubuko’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on the
ground that the defendants were entitled to immunity from suit. Azuboko filed a timely
motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which was
denied by the District Court on September 1, 2005. This appeal followed.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the
District Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim or for frivolousness is
plenary. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review the District Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e)
motion for abuse of discretion. See Le v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 403, 405-06
(3d Cir. 2003). After a careful review of the record and consideration of Azubuko’s
arguments on appeal, we agree with the District Court’s disposition of this matter.
It is a well-established principle that judges are absolutely immune from suit for
damages when they act in a judicial capacity. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12
(1991). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to
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liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citation omitted). Here, Azubuko’s complaint
consists entirely of allegations regarding actions taken by Judge Saris in her judicial
capacity. Azubuko makes no allegations that would support a determination that Judge
Saris acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Thus, Azubuko’s damages claim
fails.
Azubuko’s request for injunctive relief is also unavailing. In 1996, Congress
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an
action brought against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the amendment applies to both state and federal judges); see also Mullis
v. United States Bankr. Court for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987);
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n.5 (1993) (noting that the rules
regarding judicial immunity do not distinguish between lawsuits brought against state
officials and those brought against federal officials). Because Azubuko has not alleged
that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and
because the injunctive relief sought by Azubuko does not address the actions of Judge
Saris other than in her judicial capacity, his claim for injunctive relief is barred under
§ 1983. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999).
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The remaining defendant, the United States of America, is also protected from suit
by a different form of immunity. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the
Federal Government . . . from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). There is
no explicit waiver in this case. The United States of America is, therefore, entitled to
absolute immunity.
One matter remains. When it dismissed Azubuko’s complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the District Court did not grant him leave to amend or explicitly
consider whether any amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000).
We need not remand this matter to the District Court, however, because we cannot
conceive of any viable federal claim that Azubuko could possibly have brought on these
facts. See Grayson, 213 F.3d at 108 (noting that amendment “must be permitted . . .
unless it would be inequitable or futile”).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders dismissing
Azubuko’s complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration.

